Conditional
Recently, several psychologists have followed the proposal of Adams [1, 2] , Popper [34] , Rényi [37] , and others and interpret the indicative conditional IF H , THEN E as a conditional event, E|H (with the according probability P (E|H )), and not as a material conditional, H ⊃ E (with the according probability P (H ⊃ E)). The "mental model" theory may be an exception [5, 19] .
Interpreting the probability of the IF-THEN as the probability of the material implication leads to the paradoxes of the material implication. This is not the case if the IF-THEN is interpreted as a conditional event. For instance, the paradoxical argument form ¬H ∴ IF H , THEN E can be probabilistically interpreted as P (¬H ) = x ∴ P (H ⊃ E) ∈ [x, 1], where 0 x 1. Here the conclusion is constrained by the premise. If the IF-THEN is interpreted as a conditional event, however, only P (E|H ) ∈ [0, 1] follows. The conclusion is not constrained by the premise. This is an advantage of the conditional probability interpretation, since the premises of a counterintuitive argument form should provide no information about its conclusion. Moreover, the probability values of P (H ⊃ E) and P (E|H ) can differ substantially. Dorn [10] considers a compelling example. Let H be THE NEXT THROW OF THE DIE WILL COME UP A 5, and let E be THE NEXT THROW OF THE DIE WILL COME UP AN EVEN NUMBER. For a fair die P (H ) = 1/6 and P (E) = 1/2. Then, P (H ⊃ E) = 5/6, whereas P (E|H ) = 0.
Introducing a conditional as a conditional event is special in the coherence approach. First, while usually-for example in the Kolmogorov approach-conditional probabilities are defined by absolute probabilities, in the coherence approach conditional events are basic. "In classical approaches, a conditional probability P (E|H ) is not introduced as a direct notion, and so there is no meaning given to E|H itself" [8] . If conditional probabilities are "defined" by absolute probabilities, then there is no conditional entity per se, and also no non-probabilistic IF-THEN. A conditional event is not an ordered pair (E, H ), with H = ∅, where ∅ is the impossible event [6, p. 63] . Assigning probability values directly to the conditional event is psychologically highly plausible: a person does not need to know and process the "joint" and "marginal" probabilities to come up with a conditional probability assessment (where "conditional = joint/marginal").
Second, as in the coherence approach conditional events are basic, we may reflect upon the behavior of their truth values. They require special attention. What are the truth values of a conditional event E|H ? If H is true the answer is straightforward,
|E | H | =
1 if E = 1 and H = 1 0 if E = 0 and H = 1. 1 In 1926 Ramsey already introduced "the degree of belief in p given q" [35, p. 82] . He noted that "this does not mean the degree of belief in 'If p then q' [material implication], or that in 'p entails q' ". This is a misprint we found in several reprints of the article; "p" should be replaced by "q", and vice versa.
In terms of bets, one neither wins nor loses if the conditioning event turns out to be false. The bet is annulled and the ticket prize is payed back. A consequence of such a conception is that conditioning cannot be expressed by operators like negation, conjunction, and disjunction. There is no logical operator of conditioning [17] . This is a fundamental property that distinguishes | from ⊃. The vertical stroke operator, |, is not truth-functional, while the material implication, ⊃, is truth-functional.
When conditional events are considered to be primitive, then probability axioms should be introduced for conditional events. An elegant method to introduce and justify axioms of conditional events was proposed by Coletti and Scozzafava [6, 8] . We first give the axioms and then their justification.
Definition 1 (Conditional probability).
Let C = G × B 0 be a set of conditional events {E|H } such that G is a Boolean algebra and B ⊆ G is closed with respect to (finite) logical sums, with B 0 = B \ {∅}. A function P : C → [0, 1] is a conditional probability iff the following three axioms are satisfied
In the present context we interpret the "E|H " as IF H , THEN E. Axiom A2 specifies that, for a fixed antecedent, the probabilities of the consequents follow the rules of finite additive probability. Axiom A3 is a "multiplicative chain" rule for conjunctions.
To define the "truth-value" T (E|H ) of a conditional event E|H , Coletti and Scozzafava consider the function
I denotes the indicator of the according event.
The three values 1, 0, and p(E|H ) correspond to "win", "lose", "get money back", respectively. The sum of the three terms is thus a random variable,
, and E 1 = E ∧ H , E 2 = ¬E ∧ H , and E 3 = ¬H . Let X and Y be two such threeterm random variables. In the same way as two events can be combined by a logical operator to obtain a third event, say, A ⊕ B = C, in the same way the two random variables, say X and Y , can be combined by a numerical operator + to obtain a third random variable, X + Y = Z. What happens when two three-term random variables are added to obtain a third one? When done without specific constraints the result does not remain in the family of numbers that represents the set of conditional events. The operation may lead to a number that does not represent any event. When we consider, however, only conditional events with a fixed conditioning event and when we further consider only mutually exclusive conditioned events, E ∧ A = ∅ (so that also E ∧ A ∧ H = ∅), the function (1) is additive. In the domain of conditional events this corresponds to the disjunction of E|H and A|H . The disjunction operator "∨" for E and A given H thus corresponds to the addition operator "+" for the corresponding random variables. The same can be done for the conjunction operator "∧" and the (then corresponding) multiplication operator "×", for events such as in axiom A3.
There is a connection between coherent conditional probability and possibility distributions [4, 7] . A possibility distribution may be conceived as a standardized likelihood. The likelihood is a function of the conditioning events, P (E|H i ), where H i is the variable. Likelihoods are not probabilities. Operators on possibilities typically involve maxima for disjunctions, Π(A ∨ B) = max{Π(A), Π(B)}, and t-norms for conjunctions. Sometimes human subjects seem to confuse the "direction" of conditioning (e.g., in the well known Linda task). Standardized likelihoods might be candidates to model such cases in a "rational" way. Moreover, human max or min responses are hard to distinguish from superficial "matching" responses. In psychology "matching" means to restate numbers or other material already contained in the description of a problem, as the "solution" of the problem.
Properties of probabilistic argument forms
The lower and upper probabilities of elementary arguments are obtained by the method of cases together with some algebra, those of complex arguments by linear programming. An alternative method is used in the "Check Coherence" software [3] . Here are two examples of elementary arguments.
Example 1 (MODUS PONENS)
. The non-probabilistic MODUS PONENS infers B from the set of premises {(IF A, THEN B), A}. In the probabilistic version, the probabilities P (B|A) = y and P (A) = x are given, P (B) is sought. By the theorem of total probability we have P (B) = P (A)P (B|A) + P (¬A)P (B|¬A). The lower probability of B, P (B) = z , is obtained by (case 1) assuming P (B|¬A) = 0, so that z = xy. The upper probability is obtained by (case 2) assuming P (B|¬A) = 1, so that z = xy
Example 2 (MODUS TOLLENS)
. The non-probabilistic MODUS TOLLENS infers ¬A from {(IF A, THEN B), ¬B}. Let P (A) = x, P (B|A) = y, P (B) = z, and P (B|¬A) = q; in the probabilistic version y and 1 − z are given, (1 − x) and (1 − x) are sought. By the theorem of total probability we have z = xy
. We distinguish three cases. (a) q = z leads to the upper probability (1 − x) = 1, (b) q = 0 leads to the lower probability (1 − x) = 1 − z/y, and (c) q = 1 leads to the lower probability
The numerical solutions of complex problems may be found by linear programming. Let us consider an inference problem with n variables and m premises. The probability vector of the premises is denoted by p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m ). We build a coefficient matrix V with m + 1 rows, one row for each premise and one additional row containing 1s only. Each column is associated with one of the combinatorially possible 0/1 patterns of the n variables. In the case of logical independence there are r = 2 n such patterns. In the case of logical dependence there are fewer cases (or constituents; for how to obtain the constituents see, e.g., [14, 15] The matrix V together with the vector p builds a system of m + 1 linear equations with r unknowns.
The (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π r ) are the unknown probabilities of the constituents. The sum of these probabilities is 1. If the number of premises is less than r − 1, then the linear system has no exact solution. Next we introduce the conclusion. It is represented by the objective function
where the coefficients w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r are determined by Eq. (1). Table 1 shows the four constituents for two variables. The lower part gives the two premises of the MODUS TOLLENS and the coefficients of the linear system. The lower and upper probabilities of the conclusion ¬A with the coefficients (1, 1, 0, 0) are the minimum and maximum, respectively, of the objective function 
Example 3 (MODUS TOLLENS). The upper part of
With the help of linear programming the lower and the upper values of the function are determined. If the probabilities of the premises are given in the form of intervals only, then the lower and upper probabilities of the conclusion are found by fractional programming, which requires several linear programming steps in succession [22] .
An important property of arguments is the presence or absence of various kinds of logical and functional dependencies in sets of events. We first consider unconditional events. Logical independence is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Logical independence).
Let {E 1 , . . . , E m } be a set of m unconditional events. If all 2 m atoms are possible conjunctions, then the set of events is logically independent. Otherwise they are dependent.
We note that logical independence and dependence refer to a set of events. The mutual independence of two events is a special case.
We next consider the case of conditional events. To define logical independence for conditional events we follow [15] .
Definition 3 (Logical independence of conditional events).
A set of m conditional events is logically independent, if the number of constituents is 3 m .
The constituents are constructed by the combinations of the
For details we refer to [14, 15] .
We next consider linear dependence/independence. Let V m+2 be the coefficient matrix of the premises together with the conclusion. 
Theorem 1 (Linear dependence). If the rank r(V m
+
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Theorem). Given the probabilities P (E
of a finite number of events, the probability of a further event E m+1 ,
where p and p are lower and upper probabilities.
The first case (linear dependence) is a special case of logical dependence in which p = p . Practically all theorems of elementary probability theory belong to the first case. In the second case we say an argument is probabilistically non-informative.
As two corollaries we obtain (compare also Fig. 1 ): 
Corollary 1 (Partial independence from below). If the set of atoms in which the indicator of the conclusion is
Classification of probabilistic argument forms. l and u denote whether the lower or upper probability bound of the conclusion, respectively, is constrained by the premise(s). The circle on the left contains argument forms that are logically valid in their non-probabilistic version. The intersection of the bold circles contains the p-valid argument forms. All regions are non-empty, see Table 2 for examples.
Corollary 2 (Partial independence from above). If the set of atoms in which the indicator of the conclusion is 1 is logically independent, then
One of the best known principles in probability logic is Adams' concept of p-validity [1, 2] :
The uncertainty of the conclusion of a valid inference cannot exceed the sum of the uncertainties of its premises.
The uncertainty u(A) is defined by the 1-complement of the corresponding probability, u(A) = 1 − P (A). It may be shown that for unconditional events Adams' Hauptsatz becomes
. . , E m be a set of unconditional events with probabilities p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m . The probability of the conclusion of a valid inference cannot be less than
The corollary shows that the lower probability is not sensitive (i) to the specific logical form of the premises and (ii) to the order of the probabilities p 1 , . . . , p m . The two properties hold for unconditional events only and reflect the fact that in this case the events are truth functional. Only the lower bounds of the conclusions of those arguments that contain conditional events can be sensitive to the structure of the premises and to the specific pattern of the probability assessment. Algebraically this is associated with the matrix V which, in the case of conditionals, does not only contain 0s and 1s, but a pattern of real-valued probabilities.
Material implication is truth functional. If human subjects would interpret IF-THEN as material implication their probability responses in p-valid arguments should be insensitive to the logical form of the premises and to permutations of the probabilities of the premises. There is, however, strong evidence that human subjects are sensitive to structure and assignment. We consider this as one of the strongest arguments against the interpretation of the IF-THEN as a material implication.
Combining logic and probability in psychology
Recent probabilistic approaches to human deductive reasoning may be classified according to the interpretation of the IF-THEN and according to the relation between the premise(s) and the conclusion. One of the most influential psychological theories of human reasoning is the mental model theory [19] . The theory was extended to human probabilistic reasoning [16, 20] . The core meaning of the uncertain IF-THEN is postulated to correspond to the probability of the material implication, P (H ⊃ E). In recent studies on the meaning of the IF-THEN [13, 24, 27, 28] , the participants had either to infer the probabilities of the four truth table cases (E ∧ H , E ∧ ¬H , ¬E ∧ H , and ¬E ∧ ¬H ) from the probability of the IF-THEN (i), or the participants had to infer the probability of the IF-THEN from the probabilities Table 2 Probability logical argument forms. The logical operators are defined as usual, "|=" denotes classical logical truth. The axioms of SYSTEM P are marked by " * ", derived rules are marked by " †". Derivations of the probability propagation rules of SYSTEM P are in [14] , for the other argument forms see [31] . "v" denotes logical validity of the non-probabilistic version of the argument form. "l" and "u" denote whether the lower or the upper probability bound of the conclusion, respectively, is constrained by the probabilities of the premises. "p" denotes whether the argument form is p-valid
Name
Probabilistic version of the argument form
n n y n
the four truth table cases (ii). The interpretation of the P (IF H, THEN E) is then easily computed, as the probabilities of all truth table cases are given. The main result was that most subjects interpret the P (IF H, THEN E) as a conditional probability, P (E|H ), and not as a probability of the material implication, P (H ⊃ E).
There are at least two ways in which probabilities may enter argument forms. The relation between the premises and the conclusion can be probabilistic (i), or, the inference relation is deductive but some or all premises and the conclusion may be probabilistically valuated (ii). Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin [26] (see also [25] ) proposed that the endorsement rate of the conditional inferences is directly proportional to the conditional probability of the conclusion given the categorical premise. The MODUS PONENS, e.g., is evaluated by P (E|H ), where "H " denotes the categorical premise, and "E" denotes the conclusion. Liu [23] proposed to conditionalize on both, the categorical premise, and the conditional premise. Thus, in both approaches [23, 25, 26] the relation between the premises and the conclusion is probabilistic and not deductive.
In probability logic a probability is attached to some or all premises and the probability of the conclusion is derived by mathematical methods. Thus, the relation between the premises and the conclusion is deductive and not probabilistic. In the coherence approach we consider a set of premises E 1 , . . . , E m and a conclusion E m+1 and assume that there exists a coherent probability assessment p 1 , . . . , p m for the premises. The probability of the conclusion, p m+1 , is derived deductively from the premises. The events (propositions) may be conditional or unconditional. Our own work follows this approach. Table 2 lists probabilistic versions of well known argument forms. We investigated empirically [29, 30, 32 ] a coherence based probabilistic semantics [14] of the basic non-monotonic reasoning SYSTEM P [21] . The rules of SYSTEM P are p-valid [1, 2] . A necessary condition for p-validity is that the non-probabilistic versions of the rules are logically valid. Logical validity, however, does not guarantee p-validity. TRANSITIVITY, e.g., is logically valid but not p-valid. We call an argument form "probabilistically informative" if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is not necessarily equal to the unit interval [0, 1]. An inference rule is probabilistically non-informative, if the assignment of the unit interval to its conclusion is necessarily coherent. All p-valid arguments are probabilistically informative (see the classification in Fig. 1) .
We empirically investigated rules of SYSTEM P and rules that clearly violate SYSTEM P (see Table 2 ). We also investigated the probabilistic versions of classical argument forms, like the MODUS PONENS. In the psychology of reasoning classical argument forms were often investigated experimentally. It is interesting to compare results of the probabilistic and the more traditional non-probabilistic argument forms. We give a brief overview of our investigations on SYSTEM P and describe an example study in more detail below. 
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We translated the non-monotonic inference rules of SYSTEM P into cover-stories. The cover-stories contained the probabilities of the premises. The task of the participants was to infer the probability(-interval) of the conclusions. In all experiments we payed special attention to create an atmosphere of reasoning and to avoid quick guessing. The participants were students of our university. They were tested individually in a quiet room in the department. They were asked to take enough time.
Practically all responses in the LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE (see Table 2 ) and in the RIGHT WEAKENING conditions were coherent. For the AND, CAUTIOUS CUT, and the CAUTIOUS MONOTONICITY tasks, more than half of the interval responses were coherent. Moreover, we investigated argument forms that clearly violate SYSTEM P, namely MONOTONICITY, CONTRAPOSITION, and TRANSITIVITY. These argument forms are probabilistically noninformative. Except for TRANSITIVITY, most participants understood that these argument forms are probabilistically non-informative and they inferred wide intervals. We explain the results in the TRANSITIVITY tasks by conversational implicatures. Adams [1] stressed the probabilistic invalidity of the TRANSITIVITY and suggested to interpret TRAN-SITIVITY in common sense arguments as CUT. If a speaker first utters a premise of the form IF E 1 , THEN E 2 and then utters as the second premise IF E 2 , THEN E 3 , the speaker actually means by the second premise IF E 1 AND E 2 , THEN E 3 . The speaker does not mention "E 1 AND" to the addressee because E 1 AND is already conversationally implied and "clear" from the context. Thus, we analyzed the data of the TRANSITIVITY tasks as CUT and observed analogue patterns as in the CUT tasks.
Of special interest are the tasks in which all premises are certain. This is the case in those tasks in which the probabilities of the premises are equal to 1. These tasks serve as "control conditions" as they are comparable to the respective non-probabilistic argument forms. In the tasks with certain premises, practically all participants endorse the SYSTEM P rules. The high endorsement rates are comparable to the endorsement rates of the non-probabilistic version of the MODUS PONENS (89-100%; [11] ). In the MONOTONICITY task with certain premises the interval responses are large, which means that many participants understand the probabilistic non-informativeness of the MONOTONICITY argument form even in this special condition. In the case of TRANSITIVITY the mean lower bounds are very high. As discussed above, participants might interpret the TRANSITIVITY tasks as CUT tasks.
As an example, we describe a study on the probabilistic versions of the argument form MODUS PONENS (MP), MODUS TOLLENS (MT), DENYING THE ANTECEDENT (DA), and AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT (AC). The nonprobabilistic MP and MT are logically valid. The non-probabilistic DA and AC are not logically valid. The probabilistic MP and MT are p-valid. The probabilistic DA and AC are not p-valid. We were especially interested to compare the affirmative and the negated versions of these argument forms (i.e., negated conclusions). The four affirmative argument forms (MP, DA, MT, AC) and their negated versions (NMP, NDA, NMT, NAC) are shown in Table 6 . The non-probabilistic versions of these argument forms were extensively investigated empirically [11, 12] . The non-probabilistic MP is actually endorsed by 89-100%, the MT by 41-81%, the DA by 17-73%, and the non-probabilistic AC is endorsed by 23-75% of the participants [11] .
One hundred and twenty students participated in our study on the probabilistic versions. Thirty participants were assigned to each of the four conditions MP and NMP, DA and NDA, MT and NMT, and AC and NAC. Each participant solved three affirmative and three negated arguments. As an example, a MP task had the following form:
Imagine the following situation. Around Christmas time a certain ski-resort is very busy. This region is very popular among sportsmen, like skiers, snow-boarders, and sledge-riders. Every hour a cable-car brings the sportsmen to the top. About this cable-car we know:
Exactly 70% of the skiers wear red caps. Exactly 90% of the sportsmen are skiers. Imagine all the sportsmen in this cable car. How many of these sportsmen wear a red cap?
Participants could respond either by a point value or by two interval values. All tasks had a similar structure. Table 3 lists the probabilities presented in the premises, the normative lower and upper bounds, and the participants' mean lower and upper bound responses for the tasks.
In the MP tasks with certain premises (100% in both premises) all thirty participants solved the task correctly and responded "100%". Likewise, all participants solved the negated version of the MODUS PONENS (NMP) correctly and responded "0%". This indicates two things. First, the participants are perfect in the "certain MP" and "certain NMP". 1-12) Second, the reliability of our experimental conditions is high. The results agree with the literature. Human subjects are perfectly competent to make MP inferences. The relation between the number of responses falling into the normatively correct interval and the size of the normative interval is used as a measure of the agreement of the responses and the normative values. We use a simple χ 2 value to express the agreement, χ 2 = (f − e) 2 /e, with f = number of participants inferring coherent values, and e = expected number of participants assuming a random response generator. Let the normative interval be [l, u] . In step one the random number generator selects a lower response r l greater than l with probability 1 − l. In step two it selects a number greater than r l and less than u with probability (u − r l )/(1 − r l ). For our purposes it is sufficient to approximate r l roughly by l. Combining step one and step two by multiplying the two probabilities simplifies to u − l so that e = N · (u − l) where N denotes the number of participants in an experimental condition. Table 4 reports the χ 2 values for the various tasks for the probabilistic premises.
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The by far best agreement with the coherent intervals is obtained for the MP and the NMP. There is a significant deviance from normative intervals in the AC and NAC. Data shows that in the first AC task the participants give incoherent responses with too high values and in the NAC with too low values. Matching is one possible explanation, but omitting a negation step in the solution process (see below) is an alternative explanation.
In the DA tasks with "100%" in both premises, fourteen of the thirty participants responded correctly with the unit interval or an interval with a lower boundary very close to zero, [ 1, 100]%. Practically half of the participants understood that only a non-informative interval can be inferred if each premise is certain.
All participants inferred a probability (interval) of a conclusion C, P (C) ∈ [z C , z C ], and the probability of the associated negated conclusion, P (¬C) ∈ [z ¬C , z ¬C ]. To test the conjugacy principle of the interval responses, we checked for each participant whether both z C + z ¬C = 1 and z ¬C + z C = 1 are satisfied. Table 5 shows the number of participants that exactly satisfy the conjugacy principle in the four tasks and their negated forms. In the MP with 70% and 90% in the premises, for example, 16 of the thirty participants satisfied both conjugacy conditions. Participants with perfect conjugacy show a remarkable sensitivity with respect to the 1-complements in the context of negation.
First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences
Evans [12] gives two task features that explain several of the effects observed in classical argument forms, directionality and negativity. The MODUS PONENS is a forward task. The MODUS TOLLENS is a backward task. The MP is a forward argument because it requires an inference from the antecedent to the consequent. The MT is a backward argument because it requires an inverse inference, from the consequent to the antecedent. Directionality is best illustrated by a propositional graph. A propositional graph is a directed graph. The verteces represent propositions and the edges between two verteces represent conditionals. We attach probabilities to the edges. The absolute probability of a proposition is represented by an arc without a parent. Non-probabilistic and probabilistic studies have shown that the MT is more difficult than the MP. How can differences like these be explained with the propositional graphs?
We observed that the participants in our experiments were clearly better in lower than upper probability responses. Normatively the lower probability of the conclusion of the MP, z , is the product of the two premise probabilities, P (A)P (B|A) (see Figs. 2 and 3) . A process model assumes that human subjects understand that in MP the conclusion is, in any case, less probable than any of its premises and that the lower probability is obtained by taking 100x% of y or 100y% of x. In multiplicative forward chaining, current running results are obtained from iteratively taking a proportion of the last running results. Such an operation is easy to perform intuitively with degrees of belief. Backward processing is sometimes non-informative. In the AC the lower probability is zero. Such results cannot be obtained by "cascaded inference" as in forward inference, see Fig. 3 .
We further suppose that negations make inferences difficult so that human subjects prefer to think in terms of affirmative propositions. In an inference graph this requires taking a "detour" and switching from negations to affirmations Fig. 2 . Probability diagram for the basic argument forms of Table 6 . MT and negated MT (NMT), AC and negated AC (NAC), the two premises P1 and P2, the conclusion C, P (B|A) = y, P (A) = x and P (B) = z, P (¬A) = 1 − x, P (¬B) = 1 − z. Compare Normatively the upper probability is obtained by the conjugacy principle [38] . The upper probability of an event E is 1 minus the probability of the negation of E, p (E) = 1 − p (¬E). For the upper probability of the MP we need the probability of ¬B, the negation of the conclusion. This is obtained by taking from the product x(1 − y) the 1-complement, z = 1 − x(1 − y). A process model assumes that these steps are also involved in an analog form in human reasoning. It predicts that the upper probability of the MP is more difficult than the lower one because for its solution more steps are required. The model assumes a strong preference for affirmative propositions. In many investigations and in different domains it was observed that negated information requires additional processing efforts, takes more time, leads to more errors, etc. than affirmative information [18] .
We distinguish two families of elementary argument forms, the MP and the MT family. Each one has four members. They are obtained by affirming or negating the categorical antecedent or the conclusion. Table 6 gives the lower and upper probabilities for each of the 2 × 4 argument forms. The conjugacy principle is reflected in the 1-complements of the diagonal entries of the successive argument pairs. The upper probability of the MP, e.g., is equal to 1 minus the lower probability of the NMP. Note the symmetries in the MT family concerning the smaller/greater of two ratios.
The members of the MP family require forward processing, those of the MT family backward processing. Inferences in the MP family involve multiplication, inferences in the MT family division. In addition, inferences in the MT family require min/max-decisions. The number and the kind of steps may be used to estimate the difficulty of the argument forms. Obviously the lower probability of MP is especially easy as it requires only one step. MT requires most steps. In the NMP the lower probability of ¬B results from the product of the x(1 − y). The result is obtained by multiplicative chaining (Fig. 3) , but this time the 1-complement of the given y value is required. The upper probability for the NMP requires three steps: (i) taking the event-complement of ¬B, which is B, and which is given y, (ii) multiplicative chaining, and (iii) taking 1-complement.
By bringing probability, logic and psychology together we have tried to improve the understanding of human reasoning. We have approached the area on several routes simultaneously, including the selection of an appropriate
